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Abstract
This paper examines the built-in ﬂexibility properties — as mea-
sured by the elasticity of revenue with respect to proﬁts — of the UK
corporation tax system. Emphasis is placed on determining some of
the major inﬂuences on the extent to which total corporation tax
revenue changes when proﬁts change over the economic cycle. A mi-
crosimulation model, CorpSim, is constructed and used to obtain
numerical results. In the model, corporations use group relief, capi-
tal allowances and losses in a tax-minimising manner. The growth of
aggregate corporation tax revenue in practice in the UK appears to
be highly volatile in relation to the growth of proﬁts. High volatil-
ity in revenue elasticities is found to be especially associated with
economic downturns. In mild economic downturns, corporation tax
revenue elasticities may rise (because tax growth falls less than proﬁt
growth), but in more severe downturns, large but temporary decreases
in revenue elasticities (and even negative elasticities) can be expected.
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11 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the built-in ﬂexibility properties — as
measured by the elasticity of revenue with respect to proﬁts — of the UK cor-
poration tax system. Emphasis is placed on determining some of the major
inﬂuences on the extent to which total corporation tax revenue changes when
proﬁts change over the economic cycle. This exercise is motivated by the fact
that it has proved to be extremely di!cult to provide reliable forecasts of
UK corporate tax revenues in recent years, in part because the underlying
revenue properties of the tax are not well understood. It is important to
understand the elasticity or built-in ﬂexibility properties of the corporation
tax system, in order to be able to distinguish their eects from those of
discretionary changes in tax rates and thresholds, or other factors aecting
tax revenues such as changes in avoidance and evasion.1 Section 2 brieﬂy
discusses the concepts of buoyancy and elasticity. In a theoretical analysis
of the tax structure, Creedy and Gemmell (2006a) showed that, in priciple,
the revenue elasticity may vary considerably over the economic cycle. The
present paper extends that work by obtaining numerical orders of magnitude.
Given the complexity of corporation tax regulations and the structure
of companies, combined with the paucity of data relating to the distribu-
tion of proﬁts in the UK, the approach taken is to construct a simpliﬁed
microsimulation model. Although the model abstracts from a number of
the complexities, it is suggested that it nevertheless captures the essential
characteristics of the system. This model is referred to as CorpSim.T h e
approach contrasts with aggregate corporate tax revenue forecasting models
based on time-series regression analyses which generally cannot separate the
built-in eects on revenues from those due to other factors such as discre-
tionary actions.
T h ea p p r o a c hm a yb ec o n t r a s t e dw i t hs t a n d a r dt a xm i c r o s i m u l a t i o nm o d -
els of households, used to examine revenue and distributional implications
of income taxes and a range of transfer payments. These models are typi-
1For example, Devereux et al. (2004) considered the fact that corporate tax revenues
have remained high despite periodic decreases in the statutory tax rate. They attribute
this largely to growth in ﬁnancial companies’ proﬁts.
2cally based on a large cross-sectional survey, providing su!cient information
about each individual and household so that tax liabilities and eligibility for
transfer payments can be determined reasonably accurately given gross in-
comes.2 In the present context, a considerable challenge arises from the need
to model the transformation, for each corporation, between gross proﬁts and
taxable proﬁts.
Microsimulation models of corporation tax must be able to capture the
complex interplay between the liability conditions contained within the tax
code, and company choices allowable under that code. An important dynamic
element is involved. For example, it is necessary to model company choices of
precisely when to claim various allowances against tax and how to share these
allowances across companies within the same group. Of necessity, a model
of corporate taxes must therefore contain a dynamic component relating to
changes in proﬁts over time, in view of the crucial role played by the ability
to carry unclaimed losses and capital allowances into the future.
Any model which seeks to explain how corporation tax revenue changes
over time requires, at a minimum, three main components. These are an
initial distribution of proﬁts for a population of ﬁrms, a method of adjusting
each ﬁrm’s proﬁts over time and a method for computing the deductions
against proﬁts for each ﬁrm in each year. The way in which proﬁts are
modelled within CorpSim is described brieﬂy in section 3 (with further
details in Appendix B).This component generates the changing distribution
of proﬁts over time for a sample of corporations: for convenience, in what
follows the term ‘ﬁrm’ is used instead of ‘corporation’ here. The model is
restricted to two domestic sources of proﬁt for each ﬁrm, and complications
arising from international transactions are ignored.3
Section 4 describes how deductions, in the form of losses and capital al-
lowances arising from investment, are used in the model to oset corporation
tax. These generate the total taxable or net proﬁts of a ﬁrm, given gross prof-
2However, variations in beneﬁt take-up rates can introduce a dierence between actual
net incomes and those arising in priciple.
3This is not meant to imply that international aspects are unimportant, simply that
they cannot easily be incorporated into the present simulation model. A useful extension
would allow for the eect of tax on ﬁrms’ behaviour in an international context.
3its from the two sources. In this section, attention is restricted to the case of
a single ﬁrm in isolation. Section 5 turns to the consideration of ﬁrms within
groups, involving the introduction of group relief. The modelling of the use
of deductions is considerably more complex in this context compared with
that of a single ﬁrm, in view of the much larger number of possibilities. The
microsimulation model developed here uses a search algorithm designed to
produce, for each ﬁrm, the minimum taxable proﬁt in each period.4 However,
no attempt is made to model the endogenous formation of groups.
Having described the structure of CorpSim, some results from apply-
ing the simulation model to a variety of scenarios are discussed in section
6. These provide useful insights into the revenue elasticity properties of cor-
poration tax over the economic cycle and reveal strong similarities to the
observed buoyancy of corporation tax liabilities in recent years. Section 7
discusses revenue elasticities over the long run. Results are summarised and
conclusions drawn in section 8.
The simulation model, as presently constructed, does not incorporate be-
havioural responses in the sense that the time proﬁle of ﬁrms’ gross proﬁts,
and hence losses, are exogenously determined. Capital allowances in turn
depend on the time proﬁle of proﬁts from the two sources, given the assumed
form of investment function used in the model. Groups of ﬁrms minimise
their tax liabilities given the exogenous values of those variables. This is rea-
s o n a b l ew h e r et h ep r i m a r yf o c u so ft h es i m u l a t i o n si st oe x a m i n ec o r p o r a t i o n
tax revenues for given tax rates and allowances. Nevertheless, the present
model is capable of investigating the revenue consequences of changes in
these tax parameters, and provides a ‘no response’ benchmark against which
behavioural simulations could be compared.
2 Tax Buoyancy and Elasticity
Tax buoyancy measures the observed percentage change in tax revenues di-
vided by the percentage change in the tax base. Buoyancy is ae c t e db o t hb y
4A simpler set of rules of thumb is considered in Appendix C, and compared with the
‘tax minimising’ approach.
4Table 1: UK Corporation Tax Buoyancy, Tax and Proﬁt Growth: 1992-2003
Year Tax Proﬁt Buoyancy
growth (%) growth (%)
1992 4 6 0.7
1993 33 19 1.8
1994 30 4 7.5
1995 12 12 1.0
1996 7 -1 -5.8
1997 0.4 7 0.1
1998 12 9 1.2
1999 11 -2 -7.3
2000 10 16 0.6
2001 -13 -4 3.3
2002 4 -0.1 -36.0
2003 7 6 1.1
2004 22 18 1.2
the built-in properties of the tax structure and by any changes in any other
factors, such as changes in tax parameters or compliance, which alter the
relationship between the tax base and revenues raised from that base. The
automatic revenue growth, associated with these built-in properties — ﬁscal
drag — is a familiar feature of progressive income taxes where the existence of
ﬁxed or income-related tax allowances and rising marginal tax rates generate
a rising share of total income paid in income tax as average incomes rise.
It can be measured in unit-free terms by the revenue elasticity of a tax —
the automatic percentage change in tax revenues divided by the percentage
change in the tax base. For progressive taxes this elasticity exceeds one, be-
cause revenues rise proportionately faster than the tax base. The dierence
between buoyancy and elasticity therefore provides a measure of the impact
of changes in discretionary and other exgonous factors (such as compliance)
on tax revenues.
Table 1 shows annual gross proﬁt and corporation tax growth rates, and
the resulting revenue buoyancy, in the UK since 1992.5 This shows that
5These data, from HMRC National Statistics, Table 11.2, are for corporation tax ac-
cruals in each ﬁscal year (beginning on 05 April), for on-shore companies, excluding life
5annual tax and proﬁt growth rates are highly volatile. Buoyancy is also
highly volatile, because tax and proﬁt growth rates follow quite dierent
patterns over time. A key objective of the simulation analysis in later sections
is, therefore, to identify how far this observed volatility in corporation tax
buoyancy is also generated by simulations of automatic responses as captured
by the revenue elasticity.
3A M o d e l o f P r o ﬁ t s
This section provides a brief outline of the gross proﬁt component of Corp-
Sim; further details are in Appendix B. The dynamic component contains
both systematic and stochastic elements, and is designed to generate changes
in the distribution of proﬁts over time by tracing the proﬁts of each of a large
number of ﬁrms over a required time period. Standard stochastic models of
income distribution cannot be used because, unlike income, proﬁts are neg-
ative for many ﬁrms. The approach used here involves an assumption that
there is some minimum proﬁt (maximum negative proﬁt) below which ﬁrms
cannot go in any year.6
In practice, ﬁrms can earn proﬁts from several sources which are taxed
under dierent schedules. The corporation tax rules generally limit the ex-
tent to which losses or other deductions available under one schedule can be
oset against others. However, aggregate data suggest that total UK-source
proﬁt is dominated by two income sources: trading proﬁts and proﬁts aris-
ing from loan-relationships (interest income).7 This section therefore models
two proﬁt sources and subsequently models deductions against those proﬁts
based on the corporation tax rules applying to trading and loan-relationship
proﬁts.
assurance companies. see http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/corporate_tax/table11_2.pdf.
6CorpSim does not allow for ‘births’ and ‘deaths’ of ﬁrms (or shifts into or out of the
tax jurisdiction), but considers a ﬁxed population over a given time period.
7Data for 2003-04 show that in aggregate across ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial sectors
(excluding North Sea oil, and life assurance) gross trading proﬁts accounted for around 77
per cent of total UK-source gross proﬁts with loan relationship income accounting for a
further 16 per cent. When foreign-source income is included the former two proﬁt sources
account for around 75 per cent of total gross proﬁt.
6Suppose that proﬁt in year w is Sw where gw ?S w ? 4. The subscript
l,w h e r e b yp r o ﬁ ti sSl>w for the lth ﬁrm, has been omitted for convenience.
The application of a common, positive annual rate of growth of proﬁts to
a l lﬁ r m s ,w i t h o u ts p e c i a la l l o w a n c ef o rt h ef a c tt h a ts o m eh a v en e g a t i v e
Sw, would involve those with positive proﬁts moving, as a group, away from
those with negative proﬁts. To avoid this implausible situation, the approach
adopted here is ﬁrst to convert proﬁts into a positive variable, {w,w h e r e :
{w = Sw + gw (1)
The variable {w is subject to a growth rate made up of a systematic com-
ponent, jw, and a random component, xw.T h e w subscript on j allows the
systematic growth of proﬁts to vary in some way over time, along with the
minimum proﬁt. Thus { is speciﬁed to change according to:
{w = {w31 (1 + jw + xw) (2)
Furthermore, some ‘persistence’ in growth rates, for example if ‘success breeds
success’, is allowed such that:
xw = xw31 + yw (3)
and y is assumed to be Normally distributed as Q (0>2
y)=
Substituting (1) into (2) gives:
Sw = Sw31 (1 + jw + xw)  (gw  gw31)+gw31 (jw + xw) (4)
The growth rate, jw, is composed of a constant component, jW,r e p r e -
senting inﬂation and/or trend real growth, and a real cyclical component,
jf
w. This cyclical aspect can be described by an amplitude of dj and a wave-
length of zj. Similarly, suppose that the proportional rate of change in g
(the maximum loss) from one period to the next consists of a ﬁxed term, ˙ gW,
and a cyclical component, ˙ gf









The cyclical component has an amplitude of dg and a wavelength of zg.
This captures the notion that the extent of maximum losses can also behave
7cyclically; for example, in a recession when proﬁt growth is lower on average,
maximum losses are likely to become larger.
The above speciﬁcation is extended (as shown in Appendix B) to the case
where ﬁrms obtain proﬁts from two sources, denoted D and E.T h e s e t w o
income sources give rise to proﬁts of SD and SE, with corresponding values
of {D = SD + gD and {E = SE + gE. Starting from a given initial joint
distribution of proﬁts, such that there is some correlation, > between D and
E proﬁts, it is possible to generate proﬁt ﬂows in subsequent periods.
In the ‘benchmark’ simulation case examined below, the initial maximum
loss is set to £600k for D and E and is assumed to follow the same pattern as
the systematic components of D and E proﬁts. These have a 2 per cent trend
growth with a 0.5 per cent cyclical amplitude, and a wavelength (that is a
complete cycle) of 10 years. However, the cycles for gD and gE are ‘shifted’
relative to the proﬁt growth rate cycles so that the cyclical components of gD
and gE move inversely with the proﬁt cycles. That is, they are increasing (im-
plying larger maximum losses where relevant) when the cyclical components
of proﬁts are decreasing.
4 Simulating Deductions: Single Firms
In addition to the proﬁt generating components of CorpSim,ac r u c i a lc o m -
ponent consists of a mechanism for determining the way in which ﬁrms use
their losses and capital allowances to transform their total gross proﬁt (that
is, proﬁts from both income sources) into taxable, or net, proﬁt. Given
taxable proﬁt for each ﬁrm, it is then a simple matter to apply the UK cor-
poration tax structure. The details of the structure, involving its rates and
threstholds, are described in Appendix A. The situation facing a single ﬁrm
is very much simpler than that facing ﬁrms within a group. The model used
to examine single ﬁrms is called CorpSim-S, while that used to examine
ﬁrms within groups is called CorpSim-G.
This section discusses the way in which the total net proﬁt, that is proﬁt
after all deductions, of a single ﬁrm is calculated in CorpSim-S.C o n s i d e r
a ﬁrm which, as above, receives proﬁt from two sources D and E in period w
8of SD
w and SE






It is necessary to transform total gross proﬁt into total net proﬁt by subtract-
ing any capital allowances and losses. In practice, the use of such deductions
by a ﬁrm may depend on its expectations regarding future proﬁts and losses
arising from the two sources. However, without a clear view of, and indeed
information about, the main determinants of expected future proﬁts, the
present model abstracts from the consideration of proﬁt expectations. The
use of capital allowances is described in subsection 4.1 and the use of losses
is examined in subsection 4.2. The way in which priorities in making de-
ductions are modelled is then described in subsection 4.3. An illustrative
example is provided in subsection 4.4.
4.1 Capital Allowances
Capital allowances are calculated using ﬁscal depreciation rules applied to
ﬁrms’ investment expenditures, which requires these expenditures to be spec-
iﬁed. The capital allowances generated from investment are assumed to arise
entirely in association with the ﬁrm’s trade and hence are deductible from
trading proﬁts. This reﬂects the vast majority of investment expenditure for
which ﬁrms claim capital allowances in practice. However, the level of in-
vestment expenditure undertaken by ﬁrms may be determined by a number
of variables, among which the ﬁrm’s various sources of proﬁts are likely to be
important. Capital allowances are used to o-set D proﬁts, and any ‘excess’
capital allowances may be used to o-set E proﬁts.
Let Lw denote investment in period w. The model assumes that investment
is a simple function of both D and E proﬁts such that:



















Hence, investment is a linear function of the weighted average of the current
and previous period’s weighted sum of proﬁts from the two sources. These
weights can be speciﬁed to reﬂect alternative views regarding the relative
9importance of dierent proﬁt sources or time horizons in the determination
of investment. With >! A 0> the speciﬁcation in (7) allows for investment
to be positively related to either or both types of proﬁt and for a limited
lagged response. If ! =0 , only trading proﬁts determine investment, and
 =1implies only current proﬁts are relevant, while  =0implies that only
lagged proﬁts aect investment.
Capital allowances depend on investment by the ﬁrm and the ﬁscal de-
preciation regime. In the UK, the ﬁscal depreciation rules for plant and
machinery investment, and investment in industrial buildings, are dierent.
The former are depreciated on a writing-down basis at a rate of 25 per cent
per year, while the latter are depreciated on a straight-line basis over 25 years.
However, plant and machinery investment dominates capital allowances em-
pirically and, for this reason, only this is modelled below.
With investment in period w of Lw, capital allowances available in period w
are denoted, FDD
w .T h eD superscript in this terms reﬂects the fact that cap-
ital allowances relate to D-source proﬁts. Where  =0 =25 is the depreciation
rate, allowances are given by:
FD
D










w31 = (1)Lw31+(1)2Lw32+=== is the pool of capital allowances
available at period w, arising from previous periods’ investments.8 If there
are insu!cient D proﬁts against which to claim capital allowances, ‘excess’
capital allowances, [FDw, are said to arise. These may be deducted from E
proﬁts. Alternatively they may be used to generate a trading loss, such that
SD
w  FDD
w ? 0> which is then added to the D loss pool, OS D
w ,t ob ec a r r i e d
forward to the next period. How ﬁrms choose between these alternatives is
speciﬁed below. The capital allowance pool available at the end of period w>
to be carried forward, is given by:
FS
D







8The present analysis abstracts from the phenomenon of capital allowance ‘disclaiming’
in which some ﬁrms postpone claims for capital allowances, such that l ? 0=25=
104.2 The Use of Losses
If a ﬁrm makes a loss in period w, such that OD
w = SD
w A 0 or OE
w = SE
w A 0,
these may be claimed concurrently against SE
w or SD
w . Alternatively, they
may be carried forward and claimed against future proﬁts of the same source.
As a result, in any given period, w, there may be loss pools from the previous
period, denoted OS D
w31 and OS E
w31, which are available to oset current D and
E proﬁts respectively. Group relief of losses, where there are two ﬁrms in a
group, is considered in section 5.
The corporation tax rules used for modelling loss use are shown in Table
2. These are the rules governing trading and loan-relationship losses used in
practice, with the exception that carrying back of losses is omitted from the
model.
Table 2: Corporation Tax Rules and the Use of Losses
Proﬁt Used in-year against: Group- Carried forward:
source same other relieved within across
source source in-year source source
D: Trading Yes Yes Yes Yes No
E: Loan-relationship Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.3 Priorities in Claiming Deductions
The order in which deductions are claimed against gross proﬁts is determined
in part by the corporation tax rules and in part by ﬁrms’ choices. In the sim-
pliﬁed model here, where there are only two proﬁt sources, capital allowances
are ﬁrst deducted from D proﬁts. In the absence of disclaiming, this order is
dictated by the tax code. Whether any excess capital allowances should be
carried forward as an D loss, or used currently against E p r o ﬁ t si sac h o i c e
allowable under the tax code.9 Clearly, the use of excess allowances to oset
E proﬁts is more likely if expectations of future D proﬁts are low and current
9The size and type of losses brought forward from previous periods may also be relevant
to this decision.
11E proﬁts are high. In the absence of any information on proﬁt expectations,
t h ec u r r e n tm o d e la s s u m e st h a ta l lﬁ r m sp r e f e rt oo set any current losses or
excess capital allowances against any currently available proﬁts, rather than
carry them forward to future periods when they can no longer be used across
proﬁt sources. This reﬂects a view that the expected net present value of
current losses and capital allowances (as proﬁt osets) is greater in the cur-
rent period. If a ﬁrm faces a choice, its ability to claim deductions, and the
order in which they are claimed, depend on the size and source of its proﬁts.
Table 3 shows the assumed order (moving down the table) in which de-
ductions are claimed for the four possible combinations of proﬁts and losses
for D and E for a single ﬁrm l. The more complex choices when two ﬁrm’s
form a group are discussed in section 5 below.
Table 3: Proﬁt Combinations for a Single Firm
Proﬁt combination Proﬁt source
DE
SD
l A 0; SE















l ? 0 ——
Table 3 shows that, in general, the order in which deductions are claimed
is as follows. First, capital allowances are claimed against D proﬁts, with any
excess capital allowances then claimed against E. Second, current D or E
losses (ODw>O E w) are claimed against current proﬁts across sources. Third,
past losses are brought forward and used within source.
124.4 An Illustrative Example
Table 12 provides an example of how net proﬁts are calculated in CorpSim-
S, where only single ﬁrms are considered. This shows two ﬁrms, l and m,
where the former makes positive D and E proﬁts in year w, while the latter
makes an D loss of £800. The two ﬁrms also have loss pools brought forward
from previous periods as shown in square brackets below line 1, and capital
allowances given in line 2. The method for calculating net proﬁts ﬁrst deducts
capital allowances from D proﬁts, where possible.
Table 4: Illustrative Net Proﬁt Calculation: Single Firms









1. Gross Profit 1100 500 -800 150
[Loss pool:LPt-1] [5000] [200] [100] [100]
2. Less Cap. Allow -100 -50
3. = 1. minus 2. 1000 500 -800 100
4. Less Lt -- --100
5. Less LPt-1 -1000 -200 - 0
6. Net Profit 0 300 0  0
7. [Loss Pool:LPt] [4000] [0] [800] [100]
For ﬁrm m the D loss means that excess capital allowances are carried
across and deducted from E proﬁts (of £150), yielding line 3. As line 4
shows, £100 of current losses are then deducted from m’s E proﬁts (after
capital allowances) to yield zero net E proﬁts, shown in line 6. The remaining
£700 of current D losses are added to the £100 D loss pool from previous
periods to give a current D loss pool of £800, as in line 7. Past E losses
of £100 are also carried forward, in line 7. For ﬁrm l, having no current
losses, past losses can immediately be deducted from proﬁts (after capital
allowances) to yield net D proﬁts of zero and net E proﬁts of £300 (line 6).
Remaining losses in the loss pool are carried forward (line 7).
135 Simulating Deductions: Groups
This section describes the procedure used in CorpSim-G where single ﬁrms
join to form groups, but individual ﬁrms continue to be taxed on an un-
consolidated basis. The UK corporation tax system permits ﬁrms’ losses
and excess capital allowances to be used as deductions against the proﬁts
of group members with positive gross proﬁts. This takes the form of group
relief, which is surrendered by group loss-makers to partners in proﬁt. The
corporate tax base is composed of many single ﬁrms and also many multi-
ﬁrm groups, where there can be as many as hundreds of ﬁrms in one group.
Modelling the group relief associated with this complex type of multi-ﬁrm
group is beyond the scope of the present model.
CorpSim-G models a population of ﬁrms which are assumed to form
groups consisting of pairs of ﬁrms. Although having only two members of
a group may seem restrictive, the key analytical aspect of group relief for
present purposes is that members of a group with losses can surrender (all
or some of) those losses to members with positive proﬁts. The two group
members represented in the model can therefore be thought of as capturing
the sum of loss-making group members in practice and similarly for proﬁt-
makers. This method therefore captures the essential characteristic of group
relief, whereby losses can only be carried across ﬁrms contemporaneously. To
simplify the analysis, group relief of excess capital allowances is not consid-
ered. The priorities in claiming group deductions are discussed in subsection
5.1 and an example for two hypothetical ﬁrms in a group is provided in
subsection 5.2.
5.1 Priorities in Claiming Group Deductions
Modelling ﬁrms’ priorities in claiming deductions within groups is substan-
tially complicated by the number of proﬁt and loss combinations, even with
only two proﬁt sources and two ﬁrms in a group. In this simple case there are
nevertheless 16 possible arrangements of proﬁts and losses associated with D
14and E proﬁt sources. These are shown in Table 5.10






1 A 0 A 0 A 0 A 0
2 A 0 A 0 A 0 ? 0
3 A 0 A 0 ? 0 A 0
4 A 0 A 0 ? 0 ? 0
5 A 0 ? 0 A 0 A 0
6 A 0 ? 0 A 0 ? 0
7 A 0 ? 0 ? 0 A 0
8 A 0 ? 0 ? 0 ? 0
9 ? 0 A 0 A 0 A 0
10 ? 0 A 0 A 0 ? 0
11 ? 0 A 0 ? 0 A 0
12 ? 0 A 0 ? 0 ? 0
13 ? 0 ? 0 A 0 A 0
14 ? 0 ? 0 A 0 ? 0
15 ? 0 ? 0 ? 0 A 0
16 ? 0 ? 0 ? 0 ? 0
The order in which deductions are assumed to be claimed for the group
case within CorpSim-G is as follows. First, as for single ﬁrms, capital
allowances are deducted within ﬁrms (wherever possible) including excess
capital allowances claimed across E proﬁts (where there are insu!cient D
proﬁts). Since current losses can only be group-relived if surrendered or re-
ceived concurrently, these are deducted next. However it might be expected
that groups would wish to use losses (both current and past) in a tax min-
imising manner. This is likely to be aected by various business factors
unrelated to taxation and by the tax consequences of expectations regard-
ing future proﬁts and losses; for example by shifting losses out of companies
where they are expected to be stranded for some time. As with single ﬁrms,
10With only one ﬁrm, Table 3 showed 4 combinations, equivalent to rows 1, 5, 9, and
13 in Table 5. With an additional ﬁrm, for each of these ﬁrst 4 combinations, there are a
further 4 combinations for the second ﬁrm. However, the following rows are equivalent if
l and m are reversed: 2 = 5; 3 = 9; 4 = 13; 10 = 7; 8 = 14; 12 = 15. Hence 10 dierent
cases need to be considered.
15the model abstracts from proﬁt expectations by groups. However, it is still
the case that groups are likely to be faced with choices over the use of past
and current losses, within and between members, which aect the group’s
overall tax liability.
The simulation model therefore employs a search procedure which seeks to
deduct losses (from proﬁts net of capital allowances) such that both current
and past losses are used in ways that minimise current net proﬁts within the
group, and any remaining losses to be carried forward. For example, group
net proﬁts may be reduced to zero via a number of alternative allocations
of losses, but some of these involve greater use of past losses than others
(fewer stranded losses). The search procedure used allocates losses within
and between ﬁrms to ensure that the option with minimum group net proﬁts
and least stranded losses is achieved. Minimisation of group net proﬁts does
not guarantee tax minimisation, for example, if one small group member is
taxed at 19 per cent whilst the other is taxed at 30 per cent. However, with
the exception of these rare cases, tax minimisation can generally be presumed
from this procedure.11
5.2 An Illustrative Example
Table 13 repeats the illustration for single ﬁrms in Table 12, but for the case
where ﬁrms l and m are in a group. This conﬁguration of proﬁts corresponds
to case 3 in Table 5. Gross proﬁts, loss pools and capital allowances in year
w are as in the previous example. Capital allowances are again deducted ﬁrst
to give proﬁts, net of capital allowances, shown in line 3.
The issue for the group is how to allocate the £800 D-loss in ﬁrm m to
minimise group net proﬁts. These could all be allocated to reduce l’s D
proﬁts (of £1000 in line 3) but because l also has a large D loss pool from
11An alternative version of CorpSim-G takes a somewhat more mechanical view of
the use of deductions. In this version, deductions are subtracted from proﬁts in a ﬁxed
order, following a set of ‘rules of thumb’, rather than attempting to minimise group net
proﬁts. Deductions are subtracted in the following order: capital allowances, current losses
deducted within ﬁrms, excess capital allowances, group relief, losses brought forward within
ﬁrms from previous periods. Comparisons of elasticities using the alternative approaches
are given in Appendix C.
16Table 6: Illustrative Net Proﬁt Calculation: Groups









1. Gross Profit 1100 500 -800 150
[Loss pool:LPt-1] [5000] [200] [100] [100]
2. Less Cap. Allow -100 - -50
3. = 1. minus 2. 1000 500 -800 100
4. Less Lt -200 -500 - -100
5. Less LPt-1 -800 0 - 0
6. Net Profit 0 0 00
7. [Loss Pool:LPt] [4200] [200] [100] [100]
previous periods (£5000) this would leave £4800 of these stranded until a
future period.12 As line 4 of Table 13 shows, by allocating the £800 loss in
the way indicated, group net proﬁts become zero, and the minimum possible
loss pools (£4600) are carried forward to w +1 . In the earlier single ﬁrm
illustration, total net proﬁts were positive and loss pools totalling £4900 were
carried forward to w+1. This illustration therefore demonstrates the capacity
for group formation to reduce both current tax liabilities and the time lag
between the creation of losses and their use as proﬁt o-sets. Both of these
properties can aect the time-series proﬁle of corporation tax revenues over
the economic cycle. Further details of the procedure are given in Appendix
D.
6 Some Simulation Results
This section presents some results from applying the simulation model Corp-
Sim, described in previous sections. Emphasis is placed on the main sum-
mary statistic used to examine ﬁscal drag — the elasticity of aggregate corpo-
ration tax revenue with respect to changes in aggregate gross proﬁts. There
are many alternative scenarios which could be simulated, including dier-
12If m’s losses of £800 are surrendered to o-set l’s D proﬁts, only £200 of l’s previous
D l o s s e sc o u l db eu s e di ny e a rw, to reduce l’s net D proﬁts to zero.
17ent patterns of proﬁt growth (for example dierent trend and cycle combi-
nations), dierent degrees of randomness in the proﬁt growth process and
dierent assumptions regarding correlations both over time and across proﬁt
sources. In addition, the proportion of ﬁrms in groups could be changed, and
the implications of alternative tax rates and thresholds could be investigated.
After brieﬂy describing the simulation procedure in subsection 6.1, this
section begins in subsection 6.2 with the analysis of a benchmark case. It
then compares outcomes for alternative values of the key parameters. Thus
subsection 6.3 examines revenue elasticities resulting from larger economic
cycles, and subsection 6.4 considers the implications of introducing relative
movements in proﬁts between ﬁrms. Subsection 6.5 decomposes the revenue
elasticity into several components. Subsection 6.6 considers the importance
of the ‘small company rate’ for the revenue elasticity.
6.1 The Simulation Procedure
After generating the initial proﬁt distribution, the model is then simulated
for 20 periods from w =1 , which covers two complete cycles.13 When using
CorpSim-S, the single ﬁrm case, 20k single ﬁrms are drawn from the initial
gross D and E proﬁt distributions. It then generates their gross proﬁts for
each of the 20 periods and applies eligible deductions to calculate their total
taxable or net proﬁts, and hence their corporation tax payments, by applying
the appropriate corporation tax rate. Summing across all 20k ﬁrms in each
period yields the value of total corporation tax payments which, together with
the total proﬁts from all ﬁrms, allows the revenue elasticity to be calculated
using the year-to-year changes.
For CorpSim-G, the group case, a similar procedure is followed except
that 10k ﬁrms are randomly drawn from each of two separate pairs of proﬁt
distributions (for D and E). Selected ﬁrms from the ﬁrst set of draws are
then randomly paired with those from the second set. It would be possible
to use a non-random pairing procedure but in the absence of clear guidance
13In fact, an initial 10 year period is simulated to allow capital allowances to reach a
steady state as discussed below. All results reported below, and referred to as years 1 -
20, follow that initial 10 year period.
18from theory, or suitable data on the determinants of group membership,
the random case provides a useful benchmark. This process essentially de-
termines whether and when groups in the simulation are composed of two
proﬁt-makers, two loss-makers, and so on, and the extent of their joint proﬁts
or losses.
Firms’ initial capital allowances are determined by their current invest-
m e n t( i nt u r nd e t e r m i n e df r o mﬁ r m s ’p r o ﬁ t su s i n g( 7 ) )a n dt h e i rc a p i t a l
allowance pools. However, with no prior investment, this requires initial
capital allowance pools to be speciﬁed. This is achieved by setting the ra-




l>1))e q u a lt o in (7). This has the eect of ensuring that the
ratio of the pool of capital allowances to proﬁts available at w =1is close to
the ratio of capital allowances from new investment to proﬁts. Without this
assumption, there could be long transition periods until capital allowance
pools reached a steady state.
6.2 A Benchmark Case
The following examples begin by considering a benchmark case and then
examining variations around that case. Figure 1 shows the systematic pattern
of the growth rate of average total proﬁt (that is, the sum SD+SE) both for
a relatively low cycle amplitude of 0=005 and for a medium amplitude cycle
of 0=01. The Figure shows 10-year cycles where the low amplitude generates
a range of proﬁt growth rates between +3=2 per cent and +0=8 per cent,
around a trend of 2 per cent. The medium cycle generates higher growth at
the top of the cycle (+4=3 per cent) and growth at the bottom of the cycle
that is slightly negative. Both these cycles are examined in section 6 which
also examines a high cycle amplitude of 0=015, which generates proﬁt growth
rates in the range +5=5 per cent to 1=4 per cent. In fact, proﬁt growth rates
in practice can ﬂuctuate over a much larger range than even the high-cycle
case. The proﬁt growth rates in Figure 1 arise from the combined eect of the
assumed trend and cycle in proﬁts, and the trend and cycle in the maximum
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Figure 1: Simulated Proﬁt Cycles
the extent that stochastic processes apply. In the absence of stochastics, all
ﬁrms have the same growth rates and there are no relative changes in ﬁrms’
proﬁts.
Benchmark simulations use the low-cycle proﬁt growth shown in Figure
1, and abstract from stochastic eects: xD
lw = xD
lw =0in (18) and (19) in
Appendix B. The proﬁt parameters are given in Appendix B. Benchmark
simulations assume a correlation between D and E proﬁts of 0.05. Analysis
of around 160k ﬁrms in the CT600 database for 2001-02 to 2003-04 produced
correlation coe!cients in the region of 0.3 to 0.4. Simulations examined
include:  = 0=05>0=0>0=05 and 0=40.
B e n c h m a r kv a l u e sf o rt h eo t h e rp a r a m e t e r si n( 7 )a r es e ta sf o l l o w s : =0 ;
 =0 =15 (that is, investment is proportional to total current-plus-lagged
proﬁts);  =0 =5 (that is, past and current proﬁts aect investment equally);
and ! =0 =8 (that is, E proﬁts take a weight 80 per cent of that for D proﬁts).
These weights are not critical for the subsequent results reported, but can
























































Figure 2: Benchmark Case, Single Firms
readily be altered.
Figure 2 shows proﬁt growth and the revenue elasticity for the benchmark
case of a low proﬁt cycle (0=8 per cent to 3=2 per cent) and no stochastics, so
that all ﬁrms move together over the economic cycle. It can be seen that the
elasticity ﬂuctuates in what appears to be a counter-cyclical manner, from a
minimum of around 1 at high proﬁt growth rates to a maximum of around
1=3 a tt h el o w e s tp o i n ti nt h ec y c l e .T h a ti s ,t a xg r o w t hi su pt o30 per cent
faster than proﬁt growth at the bottom of the cycle and approximately equal
t op r o ﬁ tg r o w t ha tt h et o po ft h ec y c l e .
This result arises because when proﬁt growth falls modestly below trend,
the tendency for proﬁts to fall relative to deductions serves to increase the
elasticity; that is, tax growth falls proportionately less than proﬁt growth.
In this case the cycle is so weak (that is, it has a low amplitude) that the
mild downturn causes few ﬁrms to move out of taxpaying status.
Figure 3 shows the tax and proﬁt growth rates associated with the elas-
ticities in Figure 2. This shows that the tax growth proﬁle is a smoothed
version of the proﬁt growth proﬁle. Thus tax growth is higher than proﬁt
growth at the bottom of the cycle. In understanding this result it is im-
portant to remember that total proﬁts here are deﬁned to include negative
values (losses), consistent with National Accounting deﬁnitions, but unlike
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Figure 3: Benchmark: Tax & Proﬁt Growth
the usual HMRC deﬁnition of taxable proﬁts. However, tax growth is driven
by the growth of positive proﬁt values, which tends to be somewhat more
smooth.
Figure 4 compares the benchmark elasticity proﬁle for the case where all
ﬁrms are single with the case where all ﬁrms are in groups of two. The group
case involves a smoother elasticity proﬁle; in particular, the increase in the
elasticity during downturns is less marked. This reﬂects the fact that, by
using group losses contemporaneously to relieve group proﬁts, groups’ tax
liabilities in aggregate move more in line with their proﬁts (including losses)
in aggregate than is possible for single ﬁrms.
6.3 Elasticities with Larger Cycles
The results in Figure 4 suggest relatively small elasticities. These are much
s m a l l e rt h a nt h ev a l u e so b s e r v e df o rt a xb u o y a n c y ,w h i c hr e s u l ti np a r tf r o m
the wide ﬂuctuations in proﬁt growth, ranging from almost 20 per cent to 3
per cent per annum. As Figure 5 shows, simulating a medium cycle generates
quite dierent elasticity proﬁles. The medium cycle (with a proﬁt growth
range of 4=3 per cent to 0=2 per cent around a 2 per cent trend) produces
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Figure 4: Elasticities: Benchmark case
(requiring a dierent scale for the vertical axis in Figure 5). Most noticeably,
the tendency for the elasticity to rise during downturns is essentially reversed
in Figure 5 with the elasticity dropping close to, or below, zero at the bottom
of the recession, but with higher values going into and coming out of the
recession.
This phenomenon is even more pronounced when a high cycle, with a
range of 5=5 per cent to 1=4 per cent combined with a 2 per cent trend,
is simulated. This produces elasticities as low as 4 at the bottom of the
recession. This reﬂects the fact that more severe recessions produce many
more ﬁrms and groups going into loss and hence becoming non-taxpayers,
with zero revenue elasticities. Hence tax revenues can fall suddenly even if
proﬁt growth remains positive. Equally negative elasticities can arise when
recessions generate negative proﬁt growth but tax growth remains positive.
This is the case for single ﬁrms in Figure 5 where the negative proﬁt growth
of 0=2 per cent in years 8 and 9 is insu!cient to turn tax growth negative,
with resulting negative elasticities. Small positive proﬁt growth in year 10
(coming out of the recession) then yields a large positive elasticity. Figure
5 also suggests that, apart from during recessionary periods, the elasticity
proﬁle is relatively ﬂat around a value of 1.
These results suggest that a regular cyclical process, even without any
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Figure 5: Elasticities: Medium cycle
stochastic eects, can nevertheless produce quite volatile revenue elasticities,
moving quickly between positive and negative values in a similar manner to
that observed for UK corporate tax buoyancy in Table 1.
6.4 Introducing Relative Proﬁt Changes
In practice there are relative movements of ﬁrms within the proﬁt distrib-
ution. Many ﬁrms can behave dierently from the average, either because
they make endogenous ﬁrm-speciﬁc changes with beneﬁcial or adverse conse-
quences for their proﬁt levels, or because they experience unusual exogenous
changes which aect their proﬁts. The simulation model captures this by
allowing for both random ﬁrm-speciﬁc proﬁt shocks and the possibility of se-
rial correlation in proﬁts. In the latter case, a higher change in proﬁts in one
period may increase, or reduce, the probability of higher changes in proﬁts
in subsequent periods; this captures the phenomenon where ‘success breeds
success’.
To allow the extent to which random eects impact on ﬁrms’ proﬁts
to vary, simulations were carried out using two alternative values for the
variance terms, 2
xD> 2
xE in equation (17) in Appendix B. Setting 2
xD =
2
xE =0 =001 is a relatively high variance, implying a standard deviation of
24around 3 per cent such that proﬁt growth for about 50 per cent of ﬁrms lie
outside ±3 per cent of the mean proﬁt growth rate. That is, at the mid-point
of a cycle with trend growth of 2 per cent, around half of all ﬁrms experience
proﬁt growth outside the 1 per cent to +5 per cent range. A lower variance
of 0=0002 implies a ±1=4 p e rc e n tb a n da r o u n dt h em e a n ,s oh a l fo fa l lﬁ r m s
proﬁt growth rates lie outside the range from +0=6 per cent to +3=4 per cent.
Clearly, this still represents a fairly high degree of proﬁt variability across
ﬁrms.
To identify serial correlation within trading and loan-relationship proﬁts,
the CT600 data for 2001-02 to 2003-04 were analysed. This yielded ser-
ial correlation values around 0=25 for D proﬁts and 0=2 for E proﬁts.14
Simulations use values of +0=2, 0=0 and 0=2.
Figure 6 shows the impact on the revenue elasticity of allowing for the
high and low variance cases above, with zero serial correlation. These are
obtained for the group case with a medium cycle as shown in Figure 5. (The
zero variance case in Figure 6 is equivalent to the group case in Figure 5; all
simulations set serial correlation to zero). It can be seen in Figure 6 that
allowing for stochastic eects further increases the volatility of the revenue
elasticity especially, but not exclusively, during recessions (for example years
8—10). Finally allowing for positive or negative serial correlation (0=2, +0=2)
in the random component of proﬁt growth has little eect on the revenue
elasticities. In both cases elasticity proﬁles look similar to those shown in
Figure 6.
6.5 Decomposing the Impact of Deductions
It was shown above that the pro-cyclical nature of capital allowances (be-
cause investment is positively correlated with proﬁts) and the counter-cyclical
nature of ﬁrms’ losses implies that these two deductions are expected simul-
taneously to have diering impacts on the aggregate corporation tax revenue
elasticity. It is therefore useful to examine revenue elasticities obtained by
setting each of these deductions, in turn, to zero. This eectively decomposes
14These values are obtained by assuming a ﬁrst order auto-regressive process for the
random component of {D
lw and {E
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Figure 6: Elasticities: Introducing Stochastics
the elasticity into eects due to loss use and group relief growth, and eects
due to capital allowance growth. Gross proﬁt growth — the denominator of
the elasticity — is the same in each case.
Figure 7 repeats the elasticity proﬁle for medium-cycle parameter values,
and also shows two decompositions: these are where there is no investment
( =  =0in (7)) and where there are no losses (gD = gE =0 ). This con-
ﬁrms the expectation that, in the absence of any losses, the pro-cyclical as-
sumption for capital allowances yields a smooth pro-cyclical elasticity proﬁle.
On the other hand, if only losses are used as deductions, the elasticity proﬁle
closely resembles the overall medium-cycle case. That is, the overall proﬁle
is most strongly driven by loss deductions rather than capital allowances.
Clearly then, the relative importance of capital allowances and losses used
within total deductions has a strong bearing on the cyclical nature of the
revenue elasticity. Of course, in practice, investment is not linked to proﬁts
in the simple manner depicted here, with proﬁt expectations, interest rates,
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Figure 7: Elasticities: Decomposing Deductions
6.6 Eliminating the Small Company Rate
This subsection examines the revenue consequences of a change in the tax
schedule: the details of the rates and thresholds that characterise the current
corporate tax system are in Appendix A. However, the outcomes from such
exercises should be treated as benchmark simulations of ‘impact eects’ since
behavioural responses to tax changes are excluded. For example, simulating
an increase in the main rate would identify the direct revenue eects of the
increased tax rate. But it would not take into account potentially important
reactions such as changes in reported gross proﬁts in the UK, or ﬁrms’ re-
sponses in the form of additional avoidance schemes to reduce tax liability
for a given value of declared proﬁts.
It was suggested above that large ﬁrms, paying the 30 per cent rate,
account for the major share of receipts, and hence movements across the tax
threshold from 19 per cent to 30 per cent would be unlikely to be important
for revenue elasticity estimates. This can be tested by setting the tax rate
in CorpSim to 30 per cent for all ﬁrms above the £10k threshold. Results
from this simulation conﬁrm that the elasticity proﬁle is little aected. For
example, comparing results with the benchmark case, elasticities at the top
27of the cycle, where proﬁt growth is 3=2 per cent, for the alternative tax rate
scenarios are almost identical at 0=94 and 0=95.D i erences are maximised at
the bottom of the cycle where proﬁt growth is 0=8 per cent. The benchmark
elasticity is 1=20 whilst a value of 1=14 is obtained using a single 30 per cent
tax rate for all ﬁrms. These dierences in the revenue elasticity in the two
scenarios arise from the increased revenues predicted when a single 30 per
cent tax rate is adopted. Since any behavioural responses would be expected
to reduce revenues below this impact eect, the limited responses to the tax
change reported here can be regarded as maximum values.
7 Revenue Elasticities over the Long-run
The previous section demonstrated the volatility of the corporation tax rev-
enue elasticity over the economic cycle, demonstrating that it can move sub-
stantially from year to year in response to changes in proﬁt growth rates.
This raises the question of whether, in a world of steady growth, an elas-
ticity value of 1 can be presumed. That is, given the UK corporation tax
system, can taxes and proﬁts be expected to grow at the same rate in a steady
state? Alternatively, given the existence of economic cycles, and therefore
volatile annual revenue elasticities, can the revenue elasticity be expected to
average 1 over a complete cycle?




Medium cycle 0.98 0.86
High cycle 0.98 0.15
Low variance (Low cycle) 0.97 1.02
High variance (Low cycle) 1.00 1.03
Low variance (Medium cycle) 0.99 0.95
High variance (Medium cycle) 1.00 0.83
Table 7 shows values for the long-run revenue elasticity, estimated from
revenue and gross proﬁt growth over 10 periods (w1 to w10)—ac o m p l e t ec y c l e
28in the model. It also shows an average revenue elasticity: this is the arith-
metic average of the 10 annual values of the elasticity, over the same period.
The benchmark case shows that, with low volatility in growth rates (both
proﬁts and tax), but no stochastic behaviour, both the elasticity measures
approximate 1 (they are 0=99 and 1=02). More volatile behaviour, whether
due to greater cyclical eects or stochastic eects, continues to be associated
with a long-run elasticity close to 1 but the additional volatility renders the
average elasticity value a very poor proxy for the long-run value. Especially
with a high cycle, the single large negative annual value, at the bottom of
the cycle, dominates the 10-year average.
These results suggest that, despite variability across ﬁrms in their proﬁt
growth being the norm in practice, over a complete cycle, proﬁt and tax
growth are approximately equal. However, given the observed volatility in
proﬁt growth rates over time, using averages of annual elasticity values is
likely to be misleading.
The simulation model incorporates thousands of ﬁrms, each with poten-
tially very dierent gross proﬁt growth rates such that some ﬁrms have zero
tax revenue elasticities (non-taxpayers) while others can take a range of posi-
tive values greater than 1. Given this, it may seem surprising that the model
robustly predicts a long-run revenue elasticity, averaged across all ﬁrms, that
is so close to 1. However, this result can be explained by recalling that, for
unchanged tax rates, tax revenue growth is equal to the growth of net proﬁts
(that is, net of all deductions). An elasticity of 1 implies that gross and
net proﬁts must be growing at the same rate over the long-run. A su!cient
condition for this to occur is that deductions and gross proﬁts grow at the
same rate, over the long-run.15
This last condition is what might be expected over a complete cycle, and
is implicit in the simulation model’s assumptions. Over a complete cycle
(and especially over several cycles) it would be surprising if investment, and
hence capital allowances, were persistently increasing or decreasing relative
15Since net proﬁt, SW = S  G> then, using a ‘dot’ over a variable to represent its rate
of growth, ˙ SW =  ˙ S  (1  ) ˙ G,w h e r e = S@SW A 1.I f ˙ S and ˙ G are equal, they both
equal ˙ SW independently of the value of =
29to proﬁts, though such a pattern might extend for some time. For losses,
the other major contributor to deductions, there is no reason to expect those
to increase or decrease relative to positive proﬁts over the long-run. For
example, though losses are expected to worsen relative to proﬁts during a
temporary downturn, if they became larger in successive cyclical downturns,
it would imply a long-run worsening of proﬁtability in the economy. Such a
phenomenon is not typically observed over several cycles.
8 Conclusions
This paper has addressed the question of how corporation tax receipts are
expected to grow over time, given an unchanged corporation tax regime and
compliance eort. Despite the existence of a number of forecasting methods
to predict corporation tax revenues (receipts or accruals) this question has
previously received surprisingly little attention. This is important for two
reasons. First, with growing public expenditure demands, it is necessary
for tax authorities to know whether, in the absence of budgetary changes,
they can expect improving or worsening revenues from corporation tax both
over the longer-term and within an economic cycle. Second, if corporation
tax revenues can rise or fall without any changes in compliance, but revenue
targets are used to assess compliance eort, the ability to meet these will be
inﬂuenced by factors inherent to the corporation tax system but outside the
control of compliance units.
Simulation results suggest a number of conclusions. The growth of ag-
gregate corporation tax revenue appears to be highly volatile in relation to
the growth of proﬁts. Volatility in revenue elasticities is generally less when
groups can share losses compared with an economy composed only of single
ﬁrms. Relatively high volatility in revenue elasticities is especially associated
with economic downturns (otherwise elasticities tend to hover around a value
of 1). This volatility occurs even when all ﬁrms’ proﬁts are assumed to grow
at the same rate, but is exacerbated when random factors allow some ﬁrms
to deviate from this common growth rate. In mild economic downturns, cor-
poration tax revenue elasticities may rise (because tax growth falls less than
30proﬁt growth), but in more severe downturns, large but temporary decreases
in the revenue elasticity (and even negative elasticities) can be expected.
Capital allowances and losses claimed against positive proﬁts have quite
dierent eects on revenue elasticities, if in general capital allowances are pos-
itively correlated (and losses negatively correlated) with proﬁts. Over a full
economic cycle, the model predicts plausibly that corporation tax revenues
and proﬁts tend to grow at the same rate (in the absense of discretionary
changes in tax rates, compliance and so on). However, due to the short-run
volatility, annual averages of revenue elasticities are a misleading guide to
long-run tax growth.
The empirical analysis of Devereux et al. (2004) sought to explain why
UK corporation tax revenues had, in general, remained high relative to GDP
since the mid-1980s, despite falling statutory corporation tax rates. They
concluded that the main factor behind this was the expansion in the share of
corporate proﬁts in GDP, mainly associated with ﬁnancial companies. This
therefore expanded the tax base, relative to GDP. The simulation model
described here has focused on how revenues change relative to the tax base,
suggesting that these are expected to be stable over the long-run, but quite
unstable in the short-run. How the tax base, proﬁts, might change over time
requires a separate analysis recognising behavioural factors, including the
potential for the tax regime itself to inﬂuence ﬁrms’ proﬁtability and how
and where their proﬁts are declared for tax purposes.
Although many simpliﬁcations were required in constructing and cali-
brating the microsimulation model CorpSim,i ti sa b l et oc a p t u r em a n yo f
the crucial features of the distribution of proﬁts in the UK and their relative
movements. The simulation results have demonstrated the value of produc-
ing a model of this kind, in view of its ability to generate valuable insights
into the behaviour of corporation tax revenue elasticities.
31Appendix A: The UK Corporate Tax Schedule
This appendix describes the actual UK corporation tax schedule, the rela-
tionship between the corporation tax paid, W>and net (taxable) proﬁt, SW,s o
that W = W
¡
SW¢
. The tax schedule in the UK involves four net proﬁt thresh-
olds, p0>===>p4,t w ot a xr a t e sw1 and w2, and two ‘marginal relief fractions’,
I1 and I2. The tax within each range is given in Table 8.
Table 8: The Corporate Tax Schedule
Proﬁt Range Tax




p0 ?S W 6 p1 W
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= w1SW  I1
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p2 ?S W 6 p3 W
¡
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= w2SW  I2
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p3  SW¢




There are therefore two ranges of net proﬁt, p1 ?S W 6 p2 and SW Ap 3
where taxation is a ﬁxed proportion of net proﬁt, w1 and w2 respectively.
Average and marginal tax rates are conventionally deﬁned with respect to
























However, since the corporation tax schedule speciﬁes the relationship between
the corporation tax paid, W> and net proﬁt, SW, average and marginal tax










Hence within each net proﬁt range in Table 8, the average and marginal
tax ratios are as shown in Table 9. These are illustrated in Figure ??.
32Table 9: Average and Marginal Tax Ratios
Proﬁt Range DWU(SW) PWU(SW)
SW 6 p0 00






p1 ?S W 6 p2 w1 w1






SW Ap 3 w2 w2













and w1 is reduced by a fraction of the proportional dierence between p1
and net proﬁt. The tax schedule obviously diers from a typical income
tax schedule where, for example, a higher tax rate is applied only to income
measured above the relevant threshold, and lower ranges of income are taxed
at lower rates. For a ﬁrm with SW in excess of p3, all of net taxable proﬁt
is subject to the higher rate of w2.
The two marginal relief fractions are determined in order to ensure that




@SW is either constant or increasing, the tax schedule
as a whole does not display marginal tax rate progression. Over the range
p0 ?S W 6 p1 the term gW@gS W = w1 + I1, and this falls to w1 over the
range p1 ?S W 6 p2. Similarly, gW@gS W falls from w2 + I2 over the range
p2 ?S W 6 p3,t ow2 when SW Ap 3.
The parameters of the current schedule are given in Table 10. These
values apply to single ﬁrms where no group relief is relevant. In the group
case, the proﬁt thresholds, p0 to p4, are divided by the number of ﬁrms in











= w1p2 = w2p2  I2 (p3  p2), and thus I2 =
p2(w2w1)
p3p2 .










Appendix B: Modelling Proﬁt Dynamics
This appendix describes the proﬁt generating component of CorpSim and
gives the parameter values used in the simulations reported above. The ﬁrst
section describes the speciﬁcation of the initial joint distribution of proﬁts
from the two sources.17 The procedure used to simulate changes is then
described. The ﬁnal section gives parameter values used.18
Proﬁts in the Initial Period
The distribution of proﬁts is positively skewed, with a substantial left-hand
tail in the region of negative proﬁts. The distribution is highly peaked, as
well as containing long ﬂat tails. For this reason, a functional form such as
the lognormal distribution, which is widely used in analyses of incomes, is
unable to capture the shape of the distribution of SD + g.19 The approach
taken here is thus to use a mixture distribution. A proportion 1 of the
density of SD + g is modelled using a lognormal distribution \(1>2
1),i n
17An alternative approach could use micro-data on company proﬁts to generate the cross-
sectional data on which the initial joint A and B distribution could be based. However,
the present method makes it possible to examine the eects of changes in the distribution.
18For a more extensive analysis of UK proﬁts data and the proﬁt model, see Creedy and
Gemmell (2006b).
19The lognormal is deﬁned only for positive values, so that SD+g is the relevant variable,
rather than SD.
34which 2
1 is relatively large to capture a platykurtic feature.20 To capture the
leptokurtic, or peaked, feature, a proportion 2 is modelled using a lognormal
distribution \(2> 2
2) in which 2
2 is relatively small. However, this type of
mixture does not capture the long right hand tail of the distribution. Hence
a third component distribution is used, consisting of the upper tail (values of
SD+g above the threshold, , of another lognormal distribution, \(3> 2
3)).
The importance of this third distribution lies in the fact that the upper tail of
the proﬁt distribution is responsible for the bulk of corporation tax payments.
For example, when companies are ranked by the size of their corporation tax
liabilities in 2003-04, HMRC data show that the largest 8 per cent of all
corporation tax payers accounted for almost 90 per cent of all companies’
corporation tax liabilities.
With two income sources, SD and SE> there are corresponding values of
{D = SD+gD and {E = SE+gE. Hence, it is necessary to consider the joint
distribution of the initial values of {D and {E. In generating the distribu-
tion of source E proﬁts, the upper tail component is not used and, instead,
additional density is added to the peaked distribution. This is because the
histograms of loan relationship proﬁts do not display such a long upper tail,
but are even more peaked than those of source D proﬁts.
Simulating Proﬁt Changes
The following sequence is used to generate the changing distribution of prof-
its. First, the random component of proportional changes for the D source
is given, where yD








To allow for the possibility that stochastic shocks to D and E may be corre-








20This has relatively low kurtosis and thus captures the more central portion of the
distribution.



















































































With two income sources, SD and SE> there are corresponding values of
{D = SD+gD and {E = SE+gE. Hence, it is necessary to consider the joint
distribution of the initial values of {D and {E. The approach adopted here is
to obtain random draws from the appropriate distribution of {D> a n dt h e nt o
select random draws from the conditional distribution of {E,g i v e n{D.F o r
each of the components of the mixture distribution described in the previous










Consider the lth ﬁrm. If yD
l is a random draw from an Q (0>1) distribution,






l is another random draw from an Q (0>1) distribution, an initial value
of {E is obtained from the conditional distribution of {E,g i v e n{D.U s i n gt h e























l = {D>l  gD and SE
l = {E>l  gE. In the case of the component
capturing the long upper tail of the distribution, all random draws from {D
which are less than  are rejected. For {D A , the corresponding conditional
value of {E is obtained, without the constraint being imposed. In each com-
ponent of the mixture, the correlation coe!cient, , is assumed to be the
same.
36Calibrating the Model: Proﬁts
Table 11 shows parameter values for the proﬁt distributions and the charac-
teristics of changes in the distribution over time. The objective is to capture
its essential characteristics so that the simulated distribution approximates,
for example, the extent of losses and the distribution of proﬁt levels relative
to tax thresholds.
Specifying gD and gE using the minimum values observed in the CT600
dataset is not appropriate, since these are extremely large values — in the
hundred millions or billions. Experimentation suggested that setting gD =
gE = £600k, together with the means and variances shown in Table 11,
yielded reasonably close approximations for the SD and SE distributions.
For example, the resulting distribution of SD (trading proﬁts) is shown in
Figure 8. This is compared with the actual distribution of trading proﬁts,
SD, for the latest year available (2003-04). This is based on data for around
160k ﬁrms in HMRC’s CT600 database: the Figure shows a representative
sample of 15k ﬁrms.21 Data on trading proﬁts and losses (Gross Case 1
proﬁts and losses) have been combined to produce the distribution shown.
The simulated distribution captures the peakedness of the distribution fairly
well, but with numbers in the larger loss classes slightly over-predicted. A
similar distribution was obtained for loan-relationship proﬁts, SE,( G r o s s
Case 3 income and losses). This is similar to that shown in Figure 8 but is
even more concentrated around -£50k to +£50k, with a mode in the -£50k
to £0 class.
As Table 11 shows, the initial distribution is modelled using platykurtic
and leptokurtic lognormal distributions, for both D and E,w i t ht h es a m e
means (6.425), but with the former having a larger variance (0.35 versus 0.05
for D; 0.001 versus 0.0001 for E). For proﬁt source D, the third distribution,
contributing only to the 10 per cent of ﬁrms in the upper tail, has a much
higher mean and variance (8.5 and 1.8 respectively). Furthermore, values
21Companies for which this database recorded zero proﬁts and zero turnover were omit-
ted. The CT600 data are derived from companies’ replies on their CT600 form, prior
to any assessment/analysis by HMRC. It may therefore include errors that subsequent
enquiries correct.
37Table 11: Parameters of the Proﬁt Distributions
Parameter value Description
Initial Proﬁt Distribution
6.425 0.35 Mean and variance of log(proﬁt+d): A
6.425 0.05 Mean and variance of log(proﬁt+d): B
600k Maximum -ve proﬁt: A and B
0.05 Correlation between proﬁt sources
0.45 Proportion peaked component
6.425 0.001 Mean and variance of log(proﬁt+d): peaked A
6.425 0.0001 Mean and variance of log(proﬁt+d): peaked B
0.10 Proportion in upper tail: A
8.5 1.8 Mean and variance of log(proﬁt+d): A upper tail
1500k Proﬁt threshold for upper tail: A
Dynamic components
0.000001 Variance of random component: A and B
0 Serial correlation coe!cient (random changes)
of {l ? 1500k generated from this distribution component are ignored. The
table also shows a correlation between D and E proﬁts of  =0 =05; see
equation (20). This is the value used in benchmark simulations in section

































































































Gross trading profit (upper limit of class in £000s)
Predicted frequency
Actual frequency, 2003-04
Figure 8: Actual and Simulated Trading Proﬁts, 2003-04
Appendix C: Modelling Alternative Deductions
Claiming by Groups
This appendix compares results using the tax minimising assumption with
an alternative assumption that groups adopt a ﬁxed order in which available
deductions are claimed. In particular, deductions are subtracted in the fol-
lowing order: (i) capital allowances; (ii) current losses are deducted within
ﬁrms; (iii) excess capital allowances are deducted within ﬁrms; (iv) losses
are group relieved; (v) losses are brought forward from previous periods and
claimed within ﬁrms. This order essentially reﬂects a rule of thumb that
current deductions are used within a ﬁrm ﬁrst and are made available to
group members only if they cannot be fully used. As with other simulations,
past losses are treated as the ﬁnal deduction to be used because, unlike other
deductions, their use is already constrained to be within ﬁrms and within
schedule.
Figure 9 shows the revenue elasticity schedules using the medium cycle
and low variance of the random growth component, for both the tax min-
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Figure 9: Elasticities: Comparing Deduction Methods
imising and ﬁxed order cases. It is clear that the method adopted can be
important for the measured size of the elasticity. It is more volatile in the
ﬁxed order case, especially during recessions, when the ﬁxed order case can
reach values of -10.
It is easier to assess what lies behind this result by considering Figure 10,
which shows proﬁles for aggregate tax revenues over the 20 year simulation,
for the two cases. This indicates, as expected, that the tax minimising proﬁle
always lies below the alternative (non-minimising) case. However, it is espe-
cially during recessions that tax minimisation makes a strong contribution
by allocating losses most e!ciently for the group. As Figures 9 and 10 show,
failing to do this makes a substantial dierence to the levels of tax liability
and the elasticity estimates in periods of large losses.
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Figure 10: Alternative Tax Revenue Proﬁles
Appendix D: Group Loss-sharing Examples
This appendix illustrates how the algorithm to minimise group net proﬁts
and stranded losses is applied to the various gross proﬁt and loss combina-
tions which can arise within groups of two ﬁrms, labelled l and m.O f t h e
ten possible combinations discussed in the text, there are eight cases where
sharing of losses is an option. The other cases are where proﬁts from all
sources are positive, or all are negative.
Tables 12 to 15 show three examples each for the eight combinations of
interest. To focus on the use of losses, capital allowances are set to zero in all
cases. These examples represent three alternative conﬁgurations of current
losses and loss pools to be carried forward and used as proﬁt o-sets. These
examples are:
i. Losses arising within the group in period w are greater than the sum of
positive proﬁts (net of capital allowances) within the group in period
w. In this case the maximum possible available losses are used to o-set
positive proﬁts, and there is no use in period w of loss pools brought
forward from period w  1. Unused losses arising in period w are added
41to the relevant loss pools carried forward to period w +1 .
ii. Losses arising within the group in period w are less than the sum of
positive proﬁts (net of capital allowances) within the group in period
w, and these proﬁts net of current losses exceed the sum of the available
loss pools from period w1. In this case, all available current losses are
used to o-set positive proﬁts in period w, and all loss pools brought
forward from period w  1 can also be used in period w.
iii. Losses arising within the group in period w are less than the sum of
positive proﬁts (net of capital allowances) within the group in period w,
but proﬁts net of current losses are less than the sum of the available
loss pools from period w  1. In this case, all available current losses
are used to o-set positive proﬁts in period w, and only a fraction of
the available loss pools brought forward from period w 1 can be used
in period w.
Example (iii) therefore requires a search procedure to identify the optimal
allocation of current losses and losses brought forward. The optimum in this
case is that combination which both minimises group net proﬁts (and hence
tax, for a given tax rate), and the carry forward of losses to period w +1 ,
where they could become stranded in future. In Tables 12 to 15 the terms
1 and 2 indicate the resulting proportions of losses used as group relief to
o-set D and E proﬁts respectively (from ﬁrm l to ﬁrm m or vice varsa).22
The remaing proportion, 1  1  2, is used within the loss-making ﬁrm (if
1 + 2 ? 1). Having searched across all possible combinations, there may
be several values of 1 and 2 which achieve the optimum outcome. In this
case, the simulation model chooses the ﬁrst one identiﬁed.
Further Details of Case 2
To illustrate how the model allocates losses, the three examples shown for
Case 2 in Table 12 are described in more detail here. Table 16 shows example
22Tables 12 to 15 also record the number of cases examined in order to identify the
optimal values of 1 and 2.
42Table 12: Use of Losses: Cases 2 and 3
case 2 case 3
Example: (i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
Firm l
Proﬁt A: 400 400 1000 400 400 1000
Proﬁt B: 200 200 500 200 200 500
Initial LP A 500 50 5000 500 50 5000
Initial LP B 100 100 200 100 100 200
net proﬁt A: 0 100 0 0 0 0
net proﬁt B: 0 0 0 0 100 0
loss claimed A: 0 0 0 0 0 0
loss claimed B: 0 0 0 0 0 0
loss pool A: 500 0 4200 500 0 4200
loss pool B: 100 0 200 100 0 200
Firm m
Proﬁt A: 100 100 100 -800 -400 -800
Proﬁt B: -800 -400 -800 100 100 100
Initial LP A 50 50 100 50 100 100
Initial LP B 50 100 100 50 50 100
net proﬁt A: 0 0 0 0 0 0
net proﬁt B: 0 0 0 0 0 0
loss claimed A: 0 0 0 700 400 800
loss claimed B: 700 400 800 0 0 0
loss pool A: 50 0 100 150 100 100
loss pool B: 150 100 100 50 0 100
1: 0 00 . 2 5 0 00 . 2 5
2: 0 0 0.625 0 0 0.625
Cases exmined: 0 0 147 0 0 147
43Table 13: Use of Losses: Cases 4 and 6
case 4 case 6
Example: (i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
Firm l
Proﬁt A: 200 1000 1000 200 1200 1200
Proﬁt B: 300 300 300 -300 -300 -300
Initial LP A 100 100 1000 100 100 1000
Initial LP B 200 200 200 200 200 200
net proﬁt A: 0 100 0 0 600 0
net proﬁt B: 0 0 0 0 0 0
loss claimed A: 0 0 0 0 0 0
loss claimed B: 0 0 0 200 300 300
loss pool A: 100 0 607.5 100 0 300
loss pool B: 200 0 192.5 300 200 200
Firm m
Proﬁt A: -600 -600 -600 400 400 400
Proﬁt B: -300 -300 -300 -500 -500 -500
Initial LP A 100 100 100 100 100 100
Initial LP B 200 200 200 200 200 200
net proﬁt A: 0 0 0 0 0 0
net proﬁt B: 0 0 0 0 0 0
loss claimed A: 200 600 600 0 0 0
loss claimed B: 300 300 300 400 500 500
loss pool A: 500 100 100 100 0 0
loss pool B: 200 200 200 300 200 200
1: 0 0 0.675 0 0 0.375
2:0 0 0 0 0 0
Cases exmined: 0 0 14 0 0 21
44Table 14: Use of Losses: Cases 8 and 10
case 8 case 10
Example: (i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
Firm l
Proﬁt A: 200 1200 1200 -300 -300 -300
Proﬁt B: -300 -50 -50 300 1300 1300
Initial LP A 100 100 1000 100 100 100
Initial LP B 200 200 200 200 200 1200
net proﬁt A: 0 650 0 0 0 0
net proﬁt B: 0 0 0 0 800 0
loss claimed A: 0 0 0 300 300 300
loss claimed B: 200 50 50 0 0 0
loss pool A: 100 0 250 100 100 100
loss pool B: 300 200 200 200 0 110
Firm m
Proﬁt A: -800 -100 -100 600 600 600
Proﬁt B: -300 -300 -300 -800 -300 -300
Initial LP A 100 100 100 100 100 1000
Initial LP B 200 200 200 200 200 200
net proﬁt A: 0 0 0 5 200 0
net proﬁt B: 0 0 0 0 0 0
loss claimed A: 0 100 100 0 0 0
loss claimed B: 0 300 300 600 300 300
loss pool A: 900 100 100 100 0 790
loss pool B: 500 200 200 400 200 200
1:0 0 0 0 0 0 . 6 5
2:0 0 0 0 0 0
Cases exmined: 0 0 0 21 0 41
45Table 15: Use of Losses: Cases 11 and 12
case 11 case 12
Example: (i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
Firm l
Proﬁt A: -200 -200 -200 -200 -200 -200
Proﬁt B: 300 1300 1300 300 1300 1300
Initial LP A 100 100 100 100 100 100
Initial LP B 200 50 800 200 200 800
net proﬁt A: 0 0 0 0 0 0
net proﬁt B: 0 450 0 0 200 0
loss claimed A: 200 200 200 200 200 200
loss claimed B: 0 0 0 0 0 0
loss pool A: 100 100 100 100 100 100
loss pool B: 200 0 225 200 0 400
Firm m
Proﬁt A: -800 -800 -800 -400 -400 -400
Proﬁt B: 300 300 300 -300 -300 -300
Initial LP A 100 100 100 100 100 100
Initial LP B 200 100 200 200 200 200
net proﬁt A: 0 0 0 0 0 0
net proﬁt B: 0 0 0 0 0 0
loss claimed A: 400 800 800 0 400 400
loss claimed B: 0 0 0 100 300 300
loss pool A: 500 100 100 500 100 100
loss pool B: 200 0 175 400 200 200
1: 0 0 0.275 0 0 0
2:0 0 0 0 0 0
Cases exmined: 0 0 13 0 0 0
46(i) where only current losses are used to oset positive proﬁts. Table 17 shows
example (ii), where both current losses, and all available loss pools, can be
used to oset positive proﬁts. Table 18 shows example (iii), where all current
losses, and a fraction of available loss pools, can be used to oset positive
proﬁts.
Case 2 (i) is relatively straightforward. With available proﬁts less than
available losses within the group, losses are allocated to the three gross proﬁt
sources in positive proﬁt as shown, to reduce net proﬁts (and hence tax
liabilities) to zero. Some period w losses are carried forward to w +1 .
Case 2 (ii) is also relatively straight forward but now all current losses
and past losses can be used. All past losses, LPw31> are deducted. All current
losses are also deducted and are allocated in the following order: ﬁrst against
proﬁts within the same ﬁrm, second across ﬁrms within the same source (D
or E), third across ﬁrms and proﬁt source. In Case 2 (ii) this means that
£250 of losses are deducted from l’s D proﬁts, leaving net D proﬁts of £100.
All other net proﬁts are reduced to zero.
Case 2 (iii) is more complex because not all past losses can be used as
deductions in period w. However Table 18 shows that by setting 1 = 0.25, and
2 = 0.625, this allows all current losses to be used and the maximum past
losses of £4600 are also used. Thus, all net proﬁts are zero in period w and
the minimum losses are carried forward. To see this, consider the alternative
where instead of ﬁrm m’s E losses being used to reduce ﬁrm l’s E proﬁts by
£500 and its D proﬁts by £200 (as shown), this is reversed. A reworking
o ft h en u m b e r si nT a b l e1 8r e a d i l ys h o w st h a tﬁ r ml’s net E proﬁts, liable
to tax, would now be £100 (all others are zero) and losses carried forward
would sum to £4700.









1. Gross Profit  400  200    100  -800
[Loss pool:LPt-1] [500]  [100]    [50]  [50] 
2. Less Cap. Allow  0  0    0  0 
3. = 1. minus 2.  400  200    100  -800
4. Less Lt -400 -200  -100  -
5. Less LPt-1  0 0    0  - 
6. Net Profit 0 0    0  0 
7. [Loss Pool:LPt] [500]  [100]   [50]  [150] 









1. Gross Profit  400  200    100  -800
[Loss pool:LPt-1] [500]  [100]    [50]  [50] 
2. Less Cap. Allow  0  0    0  0 
3. = 1. minus 2.  400  200    100  -800
4. Less Lt -400 -200  -100  -
5. Less LPt-1  0 0    0  - 
6. Net Profit 0 0    0  0 
7. [Loss Pool:LPt] [500]  [100]   [50]  [150] 
Firm i Firm j









1. Gross Profit  400  200    100  -400
[Loss pool:LPt-1] [50] [100]    [50]  [100] 
2. Less Cap. Allow  0  0    0  0 
3. = 1. minus 2.  400  200    100  -400
4. Less Lt -250 -100  -50  -
5. Less LPt-1  -50 -100    -50  - 
6. Net Profit 100  0    0  0 
7. [Loss Pool:LPt] [0]  [0]    [0]  [100] 









1. Gross Profit  400  200    100  -400
[Loss pool:LPt-1] [50] [100]    [50]  [100] 
2. Less Cap. Allow  0  0    0  0 
3. = 1. minus 2.  400  200    100  -400
4. Less Lt -250 -100  -50  -
5. Less LPt-1  -50 -100    -50  - 
6. Net Profit 100  0    0  0 
7. [Loss Pool:LPt] [0]  [0]    [0]  [100] 
Firm i Firm j
48Table 18: Use of Losses: Case 2 (iii)








1. Gross Profit  1000  500    100  -800
[Loss pool:LPt-1] [5000] [200]    [100]  [100] 
2. Less Cap. Allow  0  0    0  0 
3. = 1. minus 2.  1000  500    100  -800
4. Less Lt -200 -500  -100  -
5. Less LPt-1  -800 0    0  - 
6. Net Profit 0  0    0 0 
7. [Loss Pool:LPt] [4200]  [200]    [100]  [100] 
T T   1-TT 
Firm i Firm j








1. Gross Profit  1000  500    100  -800
[Loss pool:LPt-1] [5000] [200]    [100]  [100] 
2. Less Cap. Allow  0  0    0  0 
3. = 1. minus 2.  1000  500    100  -800
4. Less Lt -200 -500  -100  -
5. Less LPt-1  -800 0    0  - 
6. Net Profit 0  0    0 0 
7. [Loss Pool:LPt] [4200]  [200]    [100]  [100] 
T T   1-TT 
Firm i Firm j
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